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PROTECTING PRIVACY USING TOR 
Most books about network security and secure communication discuss three main topics: 
availability, confidentiality, and integrity. The focus of this thesis is confidentiality which can be 
achieved by applying cryptographic algorithms to the message.  Nevertheless, it is still possible 
to track down the source and destination of the message although who is talking to whom can 
also be sensitive information. There are many technologies that help to preserve privacy online.  
 
One of the most common technologies is The Onion Router or Tor. This thesis  focuses on 
examining the concept of onion routing. 
 
Before discussing the concept of onion routing, first and foremost, this thesis discusses the 
importance of privacy and the underlying concept of communication between the web-server 
and client. The final part of this thesis concentrates on configuring a Tor node using Raspberry-
Pi and  the Google Cloud platform as well as making traffic captures and analysis.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the last twenty years, technological advancements made the production of 
electronic devices cheaper. This had an influence on the development of the 
Internet. Nowadays many can afford buying a device which has access to the 
Internet. The phenomenon of the Internet changed the way we live. It has 
changed the way we communicate, shop, travel, research, look for news and 
weather forecasts, the way we apply for jobs. Before that, one had to be 
physically present at the shop to buy a product, or visit a travel agency in order 
to book a trip. Now it is possible to do all of these just by using a device which 
has access to the Internet, a web browser, and an Internet connection. It is hard 
to believe but everything one is doing on the Internet is tracked. The web-
browser stores the web-browsing history, while servers contain a log with an IP 
address and timestamp. In addition, an ISP can eavesdrop on the traffic and 
see what one is browsing. The Internet is no more anonymous nowadays. 
Large IT companies, such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft offer a variety of 
services for free. However, are those services actually free? The answer is no. 
Users pay with their privacy. The services offered by the above mentioned 
companies gather tons of personal data. These include phone numbers, 
location data, messages, pictures and search history. The problem is the way 
this data is used. If user personal data is leaked or a third party gains access to 
the data, it may cause problems to people in their real life. Another problem lies 
within the government’s desire to control the Internet. A good example is China 
which has placed strong internet censorship and its citizens do not have access 
to particular resources. Most countries prosecute people for illegal actions on 
the internet. Tracking down a person works the following way: law-enforcing 
agencies make an inquiry to the owner of the resource where an illegal action 
has happened in order to acquire the IP address of the person who committed 
the illegal action. The IP address reveals the identity of the host who commited 
the illegal action. Another inquiry is made to ISP in order to reveal the legal 
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name of the user to whom this IP address is assigned. Technically, this means 
that all tracking is based on the IP address. In some countries, an illegal action 
can be a post or a comment about a hot political topic. That is why it is 
important to maintain privacy and anonymity online in order to preserve the 
freedom of speech. In order to become anonymous on the internet, it is possible 
to use VPN, Proxy servers, I2P, Tor, Freenet and many other software 
packages or technologies. The drawback of Proxy servers and VPNs is that 
these are centralized systems, meaning that in case the Proxy server or VPN 
gateway are compromised, it is possible to to trace down the user. Tor is a 
distributed system and was designed to protect the user's identity as well it is 
extremely popular. These were main reasons for choosing Tor for this thesis. 
The second chapter of this thesis discusses the importance of privacy and how 
private information makes a  user vulnerable. The third chapter is focused on 
explaining the way communication happens between a client and a server. The 
third chapter also compares the OSI and  the TCP/IP models, and explains the 
difference between TCP and UDP and the way DNS works and its purpose. The 
fourth chapter begins with a brief overview of Tor and concentrates on in-deep 
technical details on how Tor works. Attack vectors on Tor network are described 
in the end of the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter presents the way to configure 
a Tor node using a Raspberry-Pi and a tor node using a virtual machine. The 
end of the chapter describes the process of capturing Tor traffic and analyzing it 
using Wireshark. 
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2 PRIVACY 
The web-privacy issue is quite young. The phenomenon of the World Wide Web 
or the Internet has significantly changed the way we live. In the past decade, 
the technological advancements made our life much easier but, on the other 
hand, we have to pay a huge price for that by sharing our private information.  
 
The term “Privacy” is defined as “the quality or state of being apart from 
company or observation or freedom from unauthorized intrusion”[1]. 
By applying the meaning of term Privacy to the Internet, it means that nobody is 
spying on oneself when browsing the Internet. In other words, nobody is 
checking one's browser history or reading the private messages or taking other 
actions that intrude private life of a person. 
 
One of the main principles of democracy is that “You have the right to have your 
own beliefs, and to say and write what you think” [2] and “No one can tell you 
what you must think, believe, and say or not say” [3]. It can be hard for some 
people to express their beliefs or what they think while they know that they are 
constantly watched. 
 
2.1 The importance of privacy 
Nowadays, many people use smartphones. A good example of tracking is a 
smartphone. The smartphone has several features, such as GPS, which 
technically tracks one whenever he or she goes somewhere. The Figure 1 
shows where the author has been during Saturday 28th of May 2016. It is a 
screenshot from the timeline feature in Google Maps. 
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Figure 1. Google Maps timeline 
 
How does that information make one vulnerable? Probably this particular piece 
of information does not, but there are actionsthat one is doing consistently, such 
as going to school, work or shopping. Those actions are tracked by the phones 
on everyday basis. By gathering a huge amount of data, it is possible to find the 
patterns. In this case, it will be possible to predict where a particular person will 
be and at what time with quite great accuracy. The issue with private 
information can be stated in the following question: what happens if this data 
falls into wrong hands?  
 
The privacy issue also applies to web-browsing. It is possible to extract valuable 
information based on one’s search history or browser history and look for 
patterns there. The following screenshot (Fig. 2) represents the author’s Google 
search history, for his personal Google account. From the following screenshot, 
it is possible to find out that author is most probably studying or working in IT 
industry, who speaks Russian (ru.wikipedia.com) and who is interested in 
programming (stackowerflow.com) and network engineering (cisco.com) as well 
as Linux (ask.ubuntu.com).  
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Figure 2. Google search history 
 
There are plenty of open source tools that are designed to protect one’s 
anonymity such as: Freenet, I2P and Tor. All those software packages have 
their own advantages and disadvantages. The author has choosed Tor because 
it is the most popular and the fastest, in terms of bandwidth, anonymity software 
package. 
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3 CLIENT-SERVER MODEL 
Tor software supports various communication application layer protocols, such 
as: HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IRC and so on [4]. This thesis is focusing mainly on 
HTTP, thus, it is important to explain the communication model between a web-
server and client. 
 
3.1 Client Server communication basics 
When discussing communication between two parties, there usually exist a 
source and destination. Each of them has its own address. When Host A sends 
a message addressed to Host B, Host A indicates the destination address of Host 
B and the source address of itself (Fig. 3). This is done in order for Host B to 
know where to sent the reply message.  
 
 
Figure 3. Communication between two hosts 
Host B receives the message, processes it, and replies to Host A. The source 
and destination addresses have changed in the reply message (Fig. 3).   
The logic works for client-server communication in the Internet when a user is 
accessing a web-page.  
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Figure 4. Communication between a client and the server 
A user is sending a request and indicates its address as source. The server 
receives the request, processes it and sends a reply to the user. The IP address 
unveils the identity of the user, the server also logs the request, thus the requester 
is no more anonymous in the case described in Figure 4.  
3.2 OSI and TCP/IP moldels
When talking about communication models, it is necessary to mention the OSI 
(Open System Interconnection) and the TCP/IP (Transmission Control Protocol/ 
Internet Protocol ) models.  
Communication models are used to explain how computers communicate with 
each other, while protocols are set of rules used for communication.  
The following figure (Fig.5) compares the two above mentioned models and 
protocols used. 
 
Figure 5. TCP/IP vs OSI model 
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Although the two models are quite similar, the TCP/IP is used in production 
while OSI is used as reference. A more detailed explanation of OSI and TCP/IP 
models is out of the scope of this thesis and can be found in the ITU-T 
Recommendation X.200 (11/93) [ISO/IEC 7498-1:1994] [5] and RFC1180[6] 
respectively. 
3.3 Encapsulation 
In  most cases when two hosts are communicating over the network, there is an 
application which generates data. An example of such an application is a web-
browser. It generates a web request. Then this data is passed to the Transport 
layer. The concept of encapsulation is used in this case, meaning that it adds a 
header and sometimes a trailer to the data. 
 
The following figure (Fig. 6) demonstrates the UDP encapsulation concept: 
 
 
Figure 6. Encapsulation concept 
3.4 Transport Control Protocol (TCP) vs User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
Two most common transport layer protocols are TCP and UDP [7]. There is 
significant difference between these two. The UDP is lightweight and 
connectionless, while TCP is connection-oriented, meaning that TCP must 
establish a connection between the two parts before the data can be sent [8]. In 
other words, when an application uses TCP as Transport, it needs to receive a 
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confirmation that the destination has successfully received the message. UDP 
does not support this feature and is thus considered unreliable. 
 
TCP is used when reliability is needed. Applications such as VoIP (Voice Over 
IP) are loss tolerant and use UDP as the Transport layer protocol. TCP 
establishes the connection to the server, using the three way handshake (Fig. 
7): 
 
 
Figure 7. Three-way handshake 
The difference between TCP and UDP becomes more obvious when comparing 
the headers of both protocols in Figures 8 and 9: 
 
Figure 8. UDP header 
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Figure 9. TCP header 
 
It is possible to notice that TCP has a longer overhead and more options than 
UDP. The notable fields in both protocol headers are the Source and 
Destination ports. The port defines a service which runs on the server. There is 
a list of well-known ports described in RFC 1700 [9]. The HTTP server is using 
port 80 as default. The combination of port and IP address is called a socket. 
 
After data has been processed at the Transport layer it is passed to Internet or 
the Network layer. The Network layer is concerned about adding the source and 
destination IP addresses as the header. Afterwards, the packet is passed to 
Data Link layer and transmitted but the Data Link layer is out of scope of this 
thesis.  
3.5 Domain Name System 
The web-browsing starts when a user inputs the address of a web-site in the 
address bar and hits Enter. In order to successfully communicate with the 
server, the client needs to know servers IP address. This function is 
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implemented by the Domain Name System (DNS) [10]. It is used for looking up 
the IP address based on domain name, such as www.lib.ru 
 
The Figure 10 is a Wireshark capture of a DNS request: 
 
Figure 10. DNS request 
In response, the  DNS replies with the IP address of the requested domain: 
 
Figure 11. DNS reply 
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3.6 Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
The client machine obtains the IP address of the www.lib.ru server which is 
81.176.66.163 
Now the HTTP GET request can be formed.  
 
The following figure (Fig. 12) represents an HTTP GET request: 
 
Figure 12. HTTP GET request 
The client gets the following reply (Fig. 13) if the request was successful: 
 
Figure 13. HTTP Response 
When the HTTP request if formed, it is passed to the Transport layer. The 
Transport layer establishes the connection to the server using TCP in this case. 
It uses the source and destination IP address to do that. The source is the IP 
address of the host and the destination is the IP address of the server. Thus, the 
server is able to track down who was accessing the the particular service at 
particular time because it is able to identify the IP address of the originator.  
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4 ONION ROUTING 
After briefly describing the underlying technologies behind the client server 
communication model used by HTTP, it is possible to proceed to the concept of 
Onion Routing and Tor. 
 
4.1 Onion Routing history 
The history of Tor network starts with the development of the concept of Onion 
Routing. The concept of Onion Routing was designed by the U.S. Naval 
Research Laboratory in the mid-1990s [11]. Tor was designed in 2002 and it is 
known as “Second generation onion routing” . The purpose behind the Tor is to 
protect  the anonymity of its users. Tor, presented as low-latency 
communication service, considering the time it takes to apply all cryptographic 
operations and to push the packet through the network, it is considerably slower 
than typical connection which does not use Tor network, but still the system 
provides a reasonable trade-off between reliability, efficiency and anonymity. 
Using Tor makes it more difficult to observe the internet activity of a user which 
includes web-site visits, e-mails and other forms of communication [12]. 
 
4.2 Onion Routing overview 
Onion Router connections are protocol independent and consist of three 
phases: connection setup, data movement and connection teardown. [13] 
 
x Connection setup: it is the first stage where the client machine or initiator 
creates a socalled onion which defines the route of the packet, in other 
words, the initiator chooses the Tor nodes that the packet will travel 
through.  
x Data movement: it is the second stage when the client pushes the data 
through the Tor network. 
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x Connection teardown: is the third phase when the connection is closing 
after the client chooses to not move the data through the Tor network. 
 
 
Onion by itself is a layered data structure which defines the properties of the 
connection at each node along the path such as: cryptographic algorithms and 
keys that shall be used during data movement phase.  
 
Every onion router along the path uses its public key to decrypt the entire onion 
that it receives and its duty is to pass data from one connection to another after 
applying some specific cryptographic operation. 
 
The Tor network consists of nodes. There are three types of nodes: guard node, 
relay node, and exit node (Fig. 14).  
 
 
Figure 14. Tor topology 
 
x The guard node is the only node that knows the host’s identity. It acts as 
an entry point to the Tor network. 
x The relay node is used to relay the packets to the exit node, which 
makes the system more secure to identity revealing attacks.  
x The exit node is used to relay the traffic to the requested resource.
 
 
Taking out the technical details, the Tor network works as follows. Figure 15 is a 
graphical representation of Tor topology: 
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1. Host gets a list of available nodes from the Tor directory (request is 
encrypted) 
2. Host selects the nodes and creates the circuit 
3. Host relays the packets through the Tor network 
4. The packets received by the requested resource have a source IP 
address of the exit node. 
 
 
Figure 15. Tor topology including Tor directory 
 
In addition,Tor is used to hide the identity of the resource. This is called Hidden 
service. It has a special domain name. The logic behind the hidden service is 
that it uses a node called Rendezvous point which is used to secure the identity 
of the initiator and the resource as well. The initiator uses an identifier, which is 
a 16-character name derived from server’s public key [14].  
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4.3 Encryption in Tor 
Tor is a distributed relay network designed to make TCP connections 
anonymous. The initiator chooses the path through the Tor network and builds a 
so called circuit in which each Onion Router knows only a next-hop node and 
previous-hop node but has no information about other nodes involved in the 
circuit. Tor is a layered network. Each node in the circuit does not require any 
special privileges to run the Tor process. Every node maintains a TLS 
connection to every other node. Onion Proxy (OP) is a process run by the user. 
The scope of OP is to establish circuits across the onion network and manage 
connections from the application layer. [15] 
 
There are two keys that are managed by the onion router. The first one is a 
long-term identity key which is used to sign the TLS certificates and the onion 
router’s description such as: bandwidth, address, exit policy etc. The second 
one is a short-term onion key which is used to set up a circuit, decrypt user 
requests and negotiate ephemeral keys. 
The TLS protocol is also using the short-term keys to establish a short-term link 
key when communicating between the onion routers. The keys are rotated 
independently and periodically in order to mitigate the risk in case the keys are 
compromised.  
 
The unit of communication in the Tor network is a fixed-size cell.   
 
ORs use TLS connections to communicate with each other and with user’s 
OPs. The choice of TLS here is dictated by the following criteria:  
x TLS encrypts the data 
x TLS prevents data to be modified 
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4.4 Tor cell structure 
The traffic in ToR network is passing in fixed-size (512 bits) cells. The Figure 16 
represents the structure of a Tor cell: 
 
Figure 16. Tor control and relay cell structure 
 
The cell is divided into two parts: header and payload. The header consists of 
circuit ID which helps identifying which circuit does this particular cell belong to, 
because a single TLS connection can be carrying cells from multiple circuits 
and command which is used to tell the OR what particular action should it apply 
to the cell 
Based on the command, the cell can be either a control cell or a relay cell. The 
control cell commands are: create, destroy or padding. Create stands for 
creating a circuit, destroy for destroying it and padding is used for the keepalive 
messages. Relay cells have an additional streamID header, a Digest header 
(checksum) and a Len header (size of payload). The contents of the cell are 
encrypted or decrypted using the 128-bit AES cipher as the cell travels between 
the nodes. The CMD header contains a relay command which can be one of the 
following: 
x Relay data 
x Relay begin 
x Relay end 
x Relay teardown 
x Relay connected 
x Relay extend 
x Relay truncate 
x Relay sendme 
x Relay drop 
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4.5 Tor circuit construction process 
The initial design of onion routing implies that each TCP stream will have its 
own OR circuit. Building a circuit for each TCP stream is costly in terms of 
computing resources due to applying cryptographic operations. The Tor design 
implies that one circuit can be shared by multiple TCP streams. To minimise 
linkability between their streams, the user's OP builds a new circuit periodically, 
usually once in a minute[16]. 
 
The Figure 17 represents the way a user’s OP constructs a circuit: 
 
 
Figure 17. Tor key-exchange process 
 
The circuit construction process is incremental. Each node has to negotiate a 
symmetric key with the other one. Firstly, Alice’s OP creates a circuit with the 
OR1. Then OR1 creates a circuit with OR2 and forwards the information about 
newly created circuit to Alice. The only node which knows all the keys that are 
used to communicate between nodes is Alice. This is done to prevent man-in-
the-middle attacks, in case a node is compromised. Each OR in the circuit 
knows only its key [17]. 
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Figure 18. Layered encryption concept 
 
When Alice has established the circuit, she can start sending relay cells. When 
an OR receives a relay cell, it looks up the appropriate circuit and decrypts the 
cell header and payload in order to extract the session key for this particular 
circuit. Then the OR checks if the digest is valid. In case it is, the cell is  
processed further. OPs treat incoming relay cells similarly: they unwrap the 
relay header and payload with the session keys shared with every other OR in 
the circuit. If the digest is valid, the cell must have originated at the OR whose 
encryption has just been removed.  
When the OR replies to Alice, it uses the key shared with Alice to encrypt the 
relay header and payload and sends the cell towards Alice along the circuit. The 
next OR to receive the cell adds a further layer of encryption. 
In order to tear down the circuit, Alice needs to send a destroy cell. When this 
cell is received by the OR, it closes the circuit. [18] 
4.6 Comparing Tor network with VPN 
It is possible to compare the Tor network with VPN. Both of those services 
provide anonymit, but Tor is distributed. Thus it provides more security in case a 
node is compromised [19].In the case of VPN, all the traffic generated by the 
client machine goes through the VPN gateway. Most likely the connection 
between the client and the VPN gateway is encrypted. At the VPN gateway, 
data is decrypted and sent to its destination. 
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Figure 19. VPN topology 
 
The VPN gateway in the figure above (Fig. 19) acts as a trusted third party, but 
what happens if the VPN gateway is compromised? The answer is simple, the 
connections can be tracked down, and it is possible to uncover the identity of 
the host.  
 
The Tor network is distributed. Each OR uses its own encryption key which is 
known only to the specific OR and to the initiator. In this case, if a Tor node is 
compromised, it is still not possible to see raw data because there are used at 
least three layers of encryption. 
The Figure 20 is a representation of the Tor network: 
 
 
Figure 20. Tor topology 
All the communication between the nodes is encrypted, as well as the link 
between the host and the guard node. The sole unencrypted link is between the 
exit node and the web-server. However, by eavesdropping traffic at exit node, it 
is still not likely to discover the identity of the host.  
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4.7 Attack vectors on Tor 
 
The attacks on the Tor network can be divided into two categories: passive and 
active attacks. 
The passive attacks are: 
 
x Observing user traffic patterns  
In case there is a compromised Tor node, it is possible to eavesdrop the 
packets that are relayed by it but because of layered encryption, this will 
not reveal the source or destination of data, neither  will it  reveal the 
information contained in the message. On the other hand, this method 
reveals the traffic patterns with further processing. This gives an attacker 
the opportunity to reveal a user's identity although this requires to have 
more than one compromised Tor node and a great deal of processing.  
 
x End-to-end timing correlation 
End-to-end timing correlations are barely hidden by Tor. This requires to 
process the traffic patterns and it can end up in revealing the initiator and 
the responder’s identity.  
 
x End-to-end size correlation 
Size correlation attacks are based on simple packet counting.   
 
Active attacks are:  
 
x Compromise keys 
An attacker who knows the TLS session key is able to see the control 
cells and the encrypted relay cells and unwrap one layer of encryption, 
but a periodic key rotation limits the risk of this attack. 
27 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Alexandr Vitosinschi 
 
x Run a recipient 
An attacker who runs a web server can learn the timing patterns of the 
users which connect to it and can introduce random patterns to the 
responses.  
 
x Run a hostile OR 
A compromised node can create circuits through itself or alter traffic 
patterns to affect traffic at other nodes.  
 
x Tagging attacks 
A compromised node could tag the traffic, but integrity checks prevent 
this attack. 
 
x Replacing contents of unauthenticated protocols 
A compromised exit node can impersonate the target resource, such as 
the web-server, thus causing the unauthenticated protocol such as HTTP 
to believe that it is the real requested resource. The initiator should be 
using the protocols with end-to-end encryption such as HTTPS.  
 
x Replay attacks 
There are protocols that are vulnerable to replay attacks, but Tor is resistant 
to this kind of attacks because it will result in different negotiated session 
keys.  
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5 CONFIGURING A TOR NODE 
The practical part of this thesis will focus on configuring a Tor node using 
Raspberry-Pi and capturing traffic. It is possible to run a Tor node as bridge, 
relay, or exit. 
 
5.1 Types of Tor nodes 
There are three types of Tor nodes in the network: a bridge node, a relay node 
and an exit node. This practical part  concentrates on configuring a relay and an 
exit node, as the only difference between the two is that the relay does not have 
an exit policy. 
 
A bridge is a node that is not listed in theTor database. It lets other users to 
access normal relays. There is no publicly available list of all bridges, so it is 
impossible to say how many there are out there on the Internet. The main 
purpose of the bridge is to help people in such countries like China where Tor is 
being blocked by the ISPs.  
Running a bridge will use a small amount of traffic. The following configuration 
makes a Tor node run as a bridge. 
 
vim /etc/tor/torrc 
 
SocksPort 0 
ORPort 9001 
BridgeRelay 1 
ExitPolicy reject *:* 
 
 
A relay node is used to relay the packets in the Tor network from initiator to the 
exit. There is a special relay called guard node, which the initiator uses to enter 
the Tor network.  
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The following configurations should be applied to the /etc/tor/torrc file in order to 
make it run as a Relay node. 
 
ORPort 9001 
Nickname tortestnode 
RelayBandwidthRate 512 KB 
RelayBandwidthBurst 1024 KB 
ContactInfo alexandr.vitosinschi@edu.turkuamk.fi 
ExitPolicy reject *:* 
 
An exit node is a special node where traffic leaves the Tor network and it is 
forwarded to the internet. The exit nodes are an extremely important part of the 
Tor network because they are the linking point between the Tor network and the 
Internet. The tricky part in running a Tor exit node is that Tor can be used for 
illegal actions and the traffic will appear to be generated from a random user’s 
location. This can cause problems with law-enforcement agencies.  
In order to configure a Tor exit node, the following configuration should be 
applied to /etc/tor/torrc: 
 
ORPort 9001 
Nickname tortestnode 
RelayBandwidthRate 512 KB 
RelayBandwidthBurst 1024 KB 
ContactInfo alexandr.vitosinschi@edu.turkuamk.fi 
ExitPolicy accept *:20-23     # FTP, SSH, telnet 
ExitPolicy accept *:53        # DNS 
ExitPolicy accept *:79-81     # HTTP 
ExitPolicy accept *:110       # POP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:143       # IMAP 
ExitPolicy accept *:194       # IRC 
ExitPolicy accept *:220       # IMAP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:443       # HTTPS 
ExitPolicy reject *:* 
 
Where ORPort is port which Tor service is listening for incoming connections, 
Nickname is the name of Tor node, RelayBandwidthRate defines the 
bandwidth which can be used by Tor to relay traffic, RelayBandwidthBurst 
is the peak bandwidth which can be used by Tor to relay traffic, ExitPolicy is 
used to relay traffic from Tor network to the Internet. It is possible to tweak the 
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exit policy in order to allow specific traffic to specific resources. For example, to 
allow web traffic to www.lib.ru, it is required to use the following exit policy:  
ExitPolicy accept 81.176.66.163:80 
Where 81.176.66.163 is the IP address of lib.ru server and 80 is the HTTP port. 
To allow the web traffic to any destination, it is required to configure an exit 
policy in the following way: 
ExitPolicy accept *:80 
The asterisk (*) stands for any in configuration file. It is also possible to 
configure the hidden service using Tor which is a server with a hidden IP 
address. The hidden service cannot be accessed through the internet but only 
through the Tor network. 
 
5.2 Configuring theTor node using Raspberry-Pi 
As mentioned before, the author used the Raspberry-Pi 3 to configure the Tor 
node. The first step is installing OS. It is possible to download a Debian Linux 
(Raspbian) distribution for R-Pi from the official website[20] and write it to an 
microSD card which is afterwards plugged into R-Pi. If everything is configured 
properly, the user will be able to access R-Pi through SSH.  
 
 
 
Figure 21. Raspberry-Pi 3 
The author connected R-Pi (Fig. 21) to local router, accessed it by SSH and 
configured so it could support the following topology (Fig. 22): 
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Figure 22. Home network topology 
 
 
Configuring the network interfaces on Raspberry-Pi was carried out as follows: 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo ifconfig eth1 172.16.0.1 
 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo ifconfig eth1 netmask 255.255.255.252 
 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ ifconfig 
eth0      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr b8:27:eb:73:bf:3e   
         inet 
addr:86.50.68.122  Bcast:86.50.69.255  Mask:255.255.254.0 
         inet6 addr: fe80::b0b0:9267:5b21:694a/64 Scope:Link 
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1 
RX packets:23342 errors:0 dropped:32 overruns:0 frame:0
         TX packets:448445 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
         RX bytes:5116457 (4.8 MiB)  TX bytes:28085876 (26.7 MiB) 
 
eth1      Link encap:Ethernet  HWaddr 00:b5:6d:00:98:db   
         inet addr:172.16.0.1  Bcast:172.16.0.3  Mask:255.255.255.252 
         inet6 addr: fe80::1a60:949c:5a93:9d72/64 Scope:Link 
         UP BROADCAST RUNNING MULTICAST  MTU:1500  Metric:1 
         RX packets:373 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 frame:0 
         TX packets:293 errors:0 dropped:0 overruns:0 carrier:0 
         collisions:0 txqueuelen:1000  
         RX bytes:51985 (50.7 KiB)  TX bytes:58301 (56.9 KiB) 
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It is required to edit the /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward file and 
change the 0 to 1 in order to enable forwarding feature. 
 
Second step is to configure the iptables to do the NAT[21]: 
 
iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -j MASQUERADE 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o eth1 -m state --state 
RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT 
iptables -A FORWARD -i eth1 -o eth0 -j ACCEPT 
 
Third step in the configuration process is installing the Tor: 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt-get update 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo apt-get install tor 
After the installation process is completed it is possible to start editing the 
configuration file which is based in the /etc/tor directory 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ vim /etc/tor/torrc 
In our case, the author configured the Tor node with the following settings[24]: 
ORPort 9001 
Nickname testnodetest 
RelayBandwidthRate 150 KB 
RelayBandwidthBurst 250 KB 
ContactInfo alexandr.vitosinschi@edu.turkuamk.fi 
ExitPolicy accept *:20-23     # FTP, SSH, telnet 
ExitPolicy accept *:53        # DNS 
ExitPolicy accept *:79-81     # HTTP 
ExitPolicy accept *:110       # POP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:143       # IMAP 
ExitPolicy accept *:194       # IRC 
ExitPolicy accept *:220       # IMAP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:443       # HTTPS 
ExitPolicy reject *:* 
 
After applying changes it is required to restart the Tor service. It is done using 
the following command: 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ sudo service tor restart 
 
It is a good practice to check the if Tor service is running. It is done by the 
following command: 
pi@raspberrypi:~ $ service tor status 
● tor.service - LSB: Starts The Onion Router daemon processes 
  Loaded: loaded (/etc/init.d/tor) 
  Active: active (running) since Fri 2016-06-03 20:49:36 UTC; 
14h ago 
 Process: 9473 ExecReload=/etc/init.d/tor reload (code=exited, 
status=0/SUCCESS) 
 Process: 939 ExecStart=/etc/init.d/tor start (code=exited, 
status=0/SUCCESS) 
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  CGroup: /system.slice/tor.service 
          └─969 /usr/bin/tor --defaults-torrc 
/usr/share/tor/tor-service-def... 
 
The author has used tcpdump in order to capture the traffic which goes through 
the Tor node. 
 
tcpdump -i eth0 -s 65535 -w /home/pi/capture.cap 
 
At this point, it is a good idea to check the Tor log file. Although it may seem 
that the process is running, there is a possibility that the node can not be 
accessed by other nodes. It is necessary to check the log to verify if the service 
is running. 
 
Jun 04 12:54:20.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.5.12 (git-3731dd5c3071dcba) opening log 
file. 
Jun 04 12:54:20.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip. 
Jun 04 12:54:21.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6. 
Jun 04 12:54:21.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-
stats files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from 
now. 
Jun 04 12:54:21.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor 
Jun 04 12:54:21.000 [notice] Caching new entry debian-tor for debian-tor 
Jun 04 12:54:23.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 
'testnodetest 16EA88ED4AC04AF14FB810CECC327C0CD2A97C99' 
Jun 04 12:54:23.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting 
Jun 04 12:54:28.000 [notice] We now have enough directory information to build 
circuits. 
Jun 04 12:54:28.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network 
Jun 04 12:54:29.000 [notice] Guessed our IP address as 86.50.69.28 (source: 
194.109.206.212). 
Jun 04 12:54:30.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop 
Jun 04 12:54:30.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit 
Jun 04 12:54:30.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like 
client functionality is working. 
Jun 04 12:54:30.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done 
Jun 04 12:54:30.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 86.50.69.28:9001 is 
reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating 
success) 
Jun 04 13:09:48.000 [notice] Your network connection speed appears to have 
changed. Resetting timeout to 60s after 18 timeouts and 133 buildtimes. 
Jun 04 13:14:30.000 [warn] Your server (86.50.69.28:9001) has not managed to 
confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, 
address, /etc/hosts file, etc. 
 
The last line of the log reveals the problem. The configured Tor node is not 
reachable by the other nodes. 
It is also possible to check if the node is running through a web-site[22]. 
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% TOR Node Checker Tool 
% Copyright(c) 2016, Daniel Austin MBCS. 
%  
% Hello, 86.50.68.122, pleased to meet you. 
%  
% Checking IP: 86.50.68.122 
% 
Status: NAK 
% The IP address is *not* a TOR Node. 
 
This means that the Tor node is not visible to other Tor nodes. The author 
assumes that the problem is caused by the firewall which resides on the 
campus network and author has neither access nor permissions to change its 
configuration. 
5.3 Configuring the Tor node using Google Cloud platform 
In order to successfully capture Tor traffic, the author decided to use the Google 
Cloud platform by creating a  virtual server with Ubuntu 16.04 LTS installed.  
 
It is quite easy to create a virtual machine using the platform, it is possible to 
find the instructions on the Google Cloud platform web-site. 
 
 
Figure 23. Google cloud platform web-interface 
35 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Alexandr Vitosinschi 
When the virtual machine is created, it is possible to ssh into it and install Tor. 
Afterwards, apply changes to the /etc/tor/torrc configuration file[24]: 
 
vitosinschi@instance-1$ sudo apt-get update 
vitosinschi@instance-1$ sudo apt-get upgrade 
vitosinschi@instance-1$ sudo apt-get install tor 
vitosinschi@instance-1$ sudo vim /etc/tor/torrc 
 
ORPort 9001 
Nickname gcloudnodetest 
RelayBandwidthRate 1024 KB 
RelayBandwidthBurst 1024 KB 
ContactInfo alexandr.vitosinschi@edu.turkuamk.fi 
ExitPolicy accept *:20-23  # FTP, SSH, telnet 
ExitPolicy accept *:53     # DNS 
ExitPolicy accept *:79-81  # HTTP 
ExitPolicy accept *:110    # POP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:143    # IMAP 
ExitPolicy accept *:194    # IRC 
ExitPolicy accept *:220    # IMAP3 
ExitPolicy accept *:443    # HTTPS 
ExitPolicy reject *:* 
 
After applying changes to the configuration file it is required to restart Tor 
service and check if Tor service is up and running. It is done in the way shown 
below: 
vitosinschi@instance-1:~$ sudo service tor restart 
vitosinschi@instance-1:~$ sudo service tor status 
● tor.service - Anonymizing overlay network for TCP (multi-instance-master) 
  Loaded: loaded (/lib/systemd/system/tor.service; enabled; vendor preset: 
enabled) 
  Active: active (exited) since Sat 2016-06-04 15:25:29 UTC; 2h 1min ago 
 Process: 21201 ExecStart=/bin/true (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) 
Main PID: 21201 (code=exited, status=0/SUCCESS) 
   Tasks: 0 (limit: 512) 
  Memory: 0B 
     CPU: 0 
  CGroup: /system.slice/tor.service 
 
Afterwards, it is required to check Tor log file: 
vitosinschi@instance-1:~$ tail /var/log/tor/log 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.7.6 (git-605ae665009853bd) opening log file. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.326 [warn] OpenSSL version from headers does not match the version we're 
running with. If you get weird crashes, that might be why. (Compiled with 1000207f: 
OpenSSL 1.0.2g  1 Mar 2016; running with 1000207f: OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips  1 Mar 2016). 
Jun 04 15:25:29.347 [notice] Tor v0.2.7.6 (git-605ae665009853bd) running on Linux with 
Libevent 2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.2g-fips and Zlib 1.2.8. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.347 [notice] Tor can't help you if you use it wrong! Learn how to be 
safe at https://www.torproject.org/download/download#warning 
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Jun 04 15:25:29.348 [notice] Read configuration file "/usr/share/tor/tor-service-
defaults-torrc". 
Jun 04 15:25:29.348 [notice] Read configuration file "/etc/tor/torrc". 
Jun 04 15:25:29.351 [notice] Based on detected system memory, MaxMemInQueues is set to 
1272 MB. You can override this by setting MaxMemInQueues by hand. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.351 [warn] Tor is running as an exit relay. If you did not want this 
behavior, please set the ExitRelay option to 0. If you do want to run an exit Relay, 
please set the ExitRelay option to 1 to disable this warning, and for forward 
compatibility. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.352 [notice] Opening Socks listener on 127.0.0.1:9050 
Jun 04 15:25:29.353 [notice] Opening Control listener on /var/run/tor/control 
Jun 04 15:25:29.353 [notice] Opening OR listener on 0.0.0.0:9001 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv4 file /usr/share/tor/geoip. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Parsing GEOIP IPv6 file /usr/share/tor/geoip6. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Configured to measure statistics. Look for the *-stats 
files that will first be written to the data directory in 24 hours from now. 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Your Tor server's identity key fingerprint is 
'gcloudnodetest E6CDFAD7397842D4604878CC6C2E0EE60A03E353' 
Jun 04 15:25:29.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting 
Jun 04 15:25:32.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 80%: Connecting to the Tor network 
Jun 04 15:25:32.000 [notice] Signaled readiness to systemd 
Jun 04 15:25:32.000 [notice] Guessed our IP address as 146.148.15.102 (source: 
194.109.206.212). 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 85%: Finishing handshake with first hop 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 90%: Establishing a Tor circuit 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Tor has successfully opened a circuit. Looks like client 
functionality is working. 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 100%: Done 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort 146.148.15.102:9001 is 
reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes -- look for log messages indicating 
success) 
Jun 04 15:25:33.000 [notice] Self-testing indicates your ORPort is reachable from the 
outside. Excellent. Publishing server descriptor. 
Jun 04 15:25:34.000 [notice] Performing bandwidth self-test...done. 
Jun 04 15:26:34.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this 
range.") response from dirserver '194.109.206.212:80'. Please correct. 
Jun 04 17:16:22.000 [warn] http status 400 ("Authdir is rejecting routers in this 
range.") response from dirserver '194.109.206.212:80'. Please correct. 
 
And final step is using on-line tool [22] to check if the Tor node is running and 
reachable: 
% TOR Node Checker Tool 
% Copyright(c) 2016, Daniel Austin MBCS. 
%  
% Hello, 130.232.142.40, pleased to meet you. 
%  
% Checking IP: 146.148.15.102 
% 
Status: ACK 
Exit-Node: NAK 
% TOR-Name: gcloudnodetest 
% TOR-Onion-Port: 9001 
% TOR-Flags: Running Valid 
% TOR-Exit-Node: NAK 
% TOR-Version: Tor 0.2.7.6 
% TOR-Full-Version: Tor 0.2.7.6 on Linux 
% TOR-Uptime: 0 
% TOR-Bandwidth-Average-Bytes: 1048576 
% TOR-Bandwidth-Burst-Bytes: 1048576 
% TOR-Contact: alexandr.vitosinschi@edu.turkuamk.fi 
% 
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5.4 Capturing traffic 
At this point, it is possible to start the packet capture: 
sudo tcpdump -i ens4 -s 65535 -w 04-06-cap4.cap & 
The author used the tcpdump tool to capture the traffic. Running man tcpdump in 
command line of linux machine will give more in-deep information about the 
tool. In the case above, -i ens4 is the capture interface, -s 65535 indicates that 
the tcpdump is capturing full size packets and –w 04-06-cap4.cap is the file 
where captured packets are stored.  
After a while, the capture was downloaded on the author’s laptop and the 
analys was carried out using Wireshark.  
It is possible to acquire the list of all IP addresses in the capture file by going to 
Statistics > Endpoints  and exporting it is as CSV 
 
This is an example of output. The part of the list is attached as Appendix 1.  
Table 1. IP address list of captured packets 
Address Packets Bytes 
Packets 
A → B 
Bytes 
A → 
B 
Packets 
B → A 
Bytes 
B → 
A AS Number Country City Latitude Longitude 
54.230.15.17 20 57254 15 55659 5 1595 
AS16509 
Amazon.com, 
Inc. 
United 
States 
Seattle, 
WA 47.5839 
-
122.2995 
54.230.15.55 10 52936 9 52617 1 319 
AS16509 
Amazon.com, 
Inc. 
United 
States 
Seattle, 
WA 47.5839 
-
122.2995 
54.230.15.76 14 69798 12 69160 2 638 
AS16509 
Amazon.com, 
Inc. 
United 
States 
Seattle, 
WA 47.5839 
-
122.2995 
54.230.15.137 4 4620 2 3982 2 638 
AS16509 
Amazon.com, 
Inc. 
United 
States 
Seattle, 
WA 47.5839 
-
122.2995 
It is possible to see that the table contains the IP address, number of packets, 
AS number, country of origin, and geographical coordinates of the IP address 
owner which in many cases is the ISP. 
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5.5 Analyzing captured traffic 
The captured traffic contains several non-Tor related packets, thus, it is 
necessary to filter them out. As the Tor OR port is 9001, the traffic was filtered 
based on the port. This capture contains only the relayed packets between the 
Tor nodes. Thus now it is possible to see all the adjacent Tor connections.  
 
Figure 24. Filtering traffic based on the TCP 9001 port 
It is also possible to find out for which of the adjacent ORs there are Tor nodes 
or hosts. The most common Tor relay configuration is using port 9001 or 443 as 
OR port, thus based on that, it is possible to say that those nodes which do not 
have port 9001 or 443 open are most probably hosts or initiators. It is also 
important to keep in mind that port 443 is used for HTTPS, which means that 
although the port is open, it can still be a host which runs a web-server.  
This is a preliminary filtering. Assuming that both 443 and 9001 ports are 
closed, it means that it is a host. If one of the ports is open, it is necessary to 
use the online tool to check if this is actually a Tor node. 
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In order to check if port 9001 is open, the author used nmap, the address list of 
all connections on port 9001, and a simple bash script.  
cat ./Documents/address_list | while read in; do nmap –p 
9001,443 $in; done > ./Documents/node_check_9001 
 
The script provides the following output: 
 
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-06-08 21:58 
EEST 
Nmap scan report for 95.85.8.226 
Host is up (0.032s latency). 
PORT     STATE  SERVICE 
443/tcp  open   https 
9001/tcp closed tor-orport 
 
 
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.24 seconds 
 
Starting Nmap 7.01 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2016-06-08 21:58 
EEST 
Nmap scan report for hosted-by.yourserver.se 
(95.215.45.128) 
Host is up (0.039s latency). 
PORT     STATE  SERVICE 
443/tcp  closed https 
9001/tcp closed tor-orport 
 
 
The nmap file contains entries for each of 522 IP addresses that were using 
port 9001 as destination, thus for simplicity’s sake, the author has focused on  
few entries.  
 
Let us dig deeper and find out if  95.85.8.226 is a Tor node. In order to do that, 
it is possible to use the online tool www.dan.me.uk/torcheck?ip=95.85.8.226 
[22]. 
 
 
 
The following output is given: 
 
% TOR Node Checker Tool 
% Copyright(c) 2016, Daniel Austin MBCS. 
%  
% Hello, 193.166.134.13, pleased to meet you. 
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%  
% Checking IP: 95.85.8.226 
% 
Status: ACK 
Exit-Node: NAK 
% TOR-Name: ccrelaycc 
% TOR-Onion-Port: 443 
% TOR-Directory-Port: 80 
% TOR-Flags: Fast Guard HSDir Running Stable V2Dir Valid 
% TOR-Exit-Node: NAK 
% TOR-Version: Tor 0.2.4.27 
% TOR-Full-Version: Tor 0.2.4.27 on Linux 
% TOR-Uptime: 9555465 
% TOR-Bandwidth-Average-Bytes: 52428800 
% TOR-Bandwidth-Burst-Bytes: 104857600 
% TOR-Bandwidth-Estimated-Bytes: 22697827 
% TOR-Contact: 0xa7e9fe6cf073fda2 CristianCantoro  
 
This is a running Tor node which uses 443 as its OR port. 
 
The second interesting case is 95.215.45.128 where both ports are closed. 
The online tool [22] gives the following output: 
 
% TOR Node Checker Tool 
% Copyright(c) 2016, Daniel Austin MBCS. 
%  
% Hello, 193.166.134.13, pleased to meet you. 
%  
% Checking IP: 95.215.45.128 
% 
Status: NAK 
% The IP address is *not* a TOR Node. 
 
This means that 95.215.45.128 is not a Relay node or Exit node. Most probably 
it used the author’s node as a Guard node, in other words, an entry point to the 
Tor network. By filtering the packets based on this IP address, the author 
obtained the following: 
41 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Alexandr Vitosinschi 
 
Figure 25. Filtering based on IP address 
This is a TCP connection. It is possible to see how 95.215.45.128 establishes 
the connection, then forwards data, and closes the connection.  
Wireshark has a feature to follow the TCP connection. Using this feature 
revealed the following: 
 
 
Figure 26. TCP flow 
There are two domain names in this capture: 
x www.mtcr4dsfzjqpwitj4i.com 
x www.fdrcdsi7gbo3.net 
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By using nslookup, it is possible to find out if these domain names are valid. 
Unfortunately, it gave no information about the domain names above. At this 
point, it is possible to make an assumption that this connection was used to 
access a Hidden service.  
 
Assuming that 95.215.45.128 is an initiator of Tor circuit, his or her true identity 
still can be hidden by NAT.  
 
Based on the IP address of all 522 connections, it is possible to classify them by 
the country of origin.  
 
 
Diagram 1. Tor connections and their country of origin 
 
One of the main objectives of this thesis was to inspect the captured packets 
and find out what web-sites Tor users are visiting. In order to do that, the author 
1
6
3
3
10
4
7
6
3
118
110
2
4
2
3
1
1
2
2
54
6
4
5
17
1
1
1
21
15
1
34
8
63
Australia
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Finland
Germany
Hungary
Italy
Lithuania
Moldova
Norway
Romania
Singapore
Spain
Switzerland
UK
US
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Connections
Nodes
43 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Alexandr Vitosinschi 
has configured the exit policy in such way that it would be possible to capture 
unencrypted HTTP traffic. After filtering it out, the author found that there are 
several Google search requests. 
 
Figure 27. Inspecting captured packet with Wireshark 
The search queries that were captured included: 
x a proposed solution for the operation of a center to alleviate 
the problem of homelessness 
x the ban on wearing burqas in france in public spaces 
x absorption sfr numericable numericable strategy history 
x the new european union members and the euro advantages and 
disadvantadges of joining the euro an assessment 
x strategic marketing caroll fashion house china 
x rushdie a bend in indian history 
x "D’autres, s’orientent vers la piscine ou jouissent de la vue 
sur la mer, omniprésente sur ce territoire insulaire. Le culte 
de l’eau, on le retrouve encore au temple du bien-être : le Spa" 
x the evolution of the british parliamentary system under the 
influence of the majority phenomenon 
But let us take a closer look to the web-session with 54.230.15.76. In the 
beginning, it was obvious that someone was accessing Amazon website 
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through Tor, because this IP address belongs to Amazon. After taking a closer 
look in the packet revealed that it was a wrong assumption.   
 
 
Figure 28. Filtering based on IP address 
It is possible to see that the user had accessed www.huuto.net which is a 
Finnish online auction web site. It is also possible to reveal that user was using 
a Windows machine. Because the IP address belongs to Amazon, it is possible 
to assume that the web-site is running on Amazon Web Services. 
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6 TOR FROM A USER PERSPECTIVE 
As a normal user who cares about anonymity online and does possess 
knowledge of Linux OS, it is still possible to use Tor by downloading  theTor 
browser from the torproject.org website. 
 
The Tor Browser lets you use Tor on Windows, Mac OS X, or Linux 
without needing to install any software. It can run off a USB flash drive, 
comes with a pre-configured web browser to protect your anonymity, and 
is self-contained (portable). [23] 
 
 
Figure 29. Tor browser 
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7 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Privacy is a great  issue nowadays. There are myriads ofonline services that 
collect users’ private data and use it for marketing purposes. The problem 
arises when this data is used against the user, for example in court. There are 
numerous anonymizing technologies available which minimize the impacted 
private data collection. The most known are Tor, I2P and Freenet. It is also 
possible to use VPN gateway or a Proxy-server but both are centralized 
systems, thus in case these are compromised, it is possible to reveal the 
identity of the user.   
 
This thesis has described the communication process between a web-server 
and a client. Additionally, it has also described technical specifications of onion 
routing and the difference between normal web-browsing and web browsing 
using Tor. The practical part of the thesis consisted of installing the Tor software 
on Raspberry-Pi and making it a Tor exit node. Unfortunately, it was not a 
success because of the firewall, which author did not have access to. Instead of 
using Raspberry-Pi, there was a Tor node created using Google Cloud 
Platform. The traffic dumps were made on a virtual server and analyzed on a 
local computer. From the traffic dump,s it was possible to detect adjacent Tor 
connections. Some of the connections were coming from nodes, while others 
were from hosts.  It was also interesting to capture the exit traffic and see what 
resources users use to access through Tor.  
 
Tor users should be aware that there are many compromised nodes on the Tor 
network. A malicious node is a node where the owner tries to implement a 
passive or active attack in order to deanonymize the identity of the user. 
Detecting a malicious node is not simple because it is hardly possible to detect 
a passive attack. It is possible to assume that these exit nodes that have an exit 
policy configured only for the protocols that do not use end-to-end encryption, 
such as HTTP, are malicious. There is a possibility that the owner of that node 
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is capturing the unencrypted traffic at the exit and uses it to detect identity of the 
user. Tor users should not be using any service that does not support end-to-
end encryption, because the unencrypted message can contain the information 
which provides identity of the user, such as nickname, surname, e-mail address 
etc. Although revealing the identity of the user is possible, it requires an arsenal 
of resources, such as running multiple Tor nodes. Furthermore it is possible to 
reveal the identity of a random user but a targeted attack on anonymity is much 
more difficult.  
 
Running a Tor exit node can cause legal problems. All the traffic exiting the 
node and forwarded to the internet is seen to be originating from the person 
who runs the node. The traffic can carry some malicious code or can be a part 
of DoS attack, for example. The authorities may contact the node owner and 
interrogate him or her regarding this matter.  
 
For a non-technical user who does not run the Tor node but wants to use Tor to 
access the Internet, it is required to install the Tor web-browser in order to use 
the Tor service.  
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